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CHUCK AND STEVE'S PECCADILLO
James J White*

INTRODUCTION

Are investors in securitized receivables to be treated as the owners
of an asset whose sale has taken it beyond the reach of the trustee in
bankruptcy of their sellers? O are they to be treated as holders of a
security interest in the transferred asset who have left behind an interest
in the sellers' hands that would cause the asset to be subject to claims
By adopting
and interference by the sellers' grasping trustee?
contrasting-arguably conflicting-statements in two subsections of a
single section, the drafters of 1999 Article 9 have thrust this issue in the
faces of courts and commentators.
They did this by adopting section 9-318 which reads in full as
follows:
Section 9-318. No interest retained in right to payment that is sold;
rights and title of seller of account or chattel paper with respect to
creditors and purchasers.
(a) [Seller retains no interest.] A debtor that has sold an account,
chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain
a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.
(b)
[Deemed rights of debtor if buyer's security interest
unperfected.] For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of,
and purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a
debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's
security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights
and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor
sold.
Subsection (a) embraces the securitizers' position; it unequivocally
indorses the form of the transaction. Upon "sale" everything is gone: all
is beyond the grasp of the trustee. There are no qualifications; neither
perfection, nor notice, nor any other act is required. This "sale" of
receivables is as much a "sale" as the debtor's sale of inventory to a
buyer for value would be a "sale."
But subsection (b) looks to the substance of the transaction and
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law.
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rejects the form. Here a "sale" of certain covered receivables is the
grant of a "security interest." Like the grant of a security interest, this
sale without perfection leaves behind fragments of title large enough to
give purchase to the sellers' creditors.
Of course lawyers are accustomed to ignoring form and following
substance, and of doing the opposite. What is different here is that the
drafters ask us-with respect to the same transaction-to do one in
subsection (a) (respect form) and the other in subsection (b) (ignore
form). It may be possible to make the two subsections get along with
one another, but it requires work.
On their face, they appear
inconsistent. I am not the first to see the apparent inconsistency
between the two subsections. Members of the drafting committee saw
it,' and the use of the verb "deemed" in subsection (b) shows that the
drafters anticipated this claim.
In this article I consider how we came to this place and whether the
drafters have successfully found a path through this thicket that will
allow them to satisfy the securitizers (all is gone with a sale) and the
creditors of a seller whose buyer has not perfected (enough is left
behind despite a sale to give the creditors a hold) without, at the same
time, giving purchase to the trustee in bankruptcy of a seller of
perfected, securitized receivables.

I.

HISTORY

Long before the UCC, the law of America and even earlier, the law
of England, disregarded the form of certain credit transactions and
recognized their substance at the request of creditors who would have
been dispossessed by giving conventional meaning to those
2
transactions.
In the earliest days we see the English courts treating a nonpossessory security interest as a fraudulent conveyance that could be
upset.3 In a society where possession by the owner or his agent meant
title, the courts were slow to recognize the transfer of a non-possessory
security interest to a creditor.4 So in Twyne's Case,5 the debtor Pierce
I For example, ALl Representative Rapson, a member of the drafting committee recognized
the inconsistencies between the two subsections.
2 See Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332 (1877); Maxwell v. Montacute, Prec. Ch. 526 (1719); see
also I GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.6 (1965); 1
GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 299a (rev. ed. 1940)
(collecting cases) [hereinafter FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES]; 1 GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES

§ 11 (1943) (same) [hereinafter MORTGAGES].
3 See GILMORE, supra note 2, § 2.1.
4 See id. at 25-6 (hypothesizing that the rapidly increasing demand for credit during the
industrial revolution led to the erosion of the rule against nonpossessory security interests).
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owed money to both Twyne and another creditor who had brought suit
against him. In satisfaction of the debt to Twyne, Pierce secretly
deeded property to Twyne. Despite the conveyance, Pierce remained in
possession of the property and continued to treat the property as his
own. While the conveyance was supported by good consideration-the
value of the property exceeded the debt owed-the court held the
transaction void, and so fraudulent as against Pierce's other creditor,
because of Pierce's continued possession of the property. The court
stated that a "secret transfer is always a badge of fraud."'6 Not until the
nineteenth century did courts gradually abandon the rule against
7
nonpossessory security interests.
More modem variations on this theme are claims of "ostensible
ownership." If an owner puts goods in the hands of a consignee-or
even in some cases of a bailee-the nonowner possessors were found to
have ostensible ownership. That ownership was sufficient to cause title
to be passed on to transferees from the bailee-apparent owner. This
right is now stated most prominently in section 2-403(2). If I entrust
my watch to a watch repairman who also sells watches, I have given
him the power to pass good title to a bona fide purchaser. 8
Intangibles presented the same problem but later and in a different
form. Since possession means little or nothing in the case of intangible
rights, how was the law to recognize the transfer of those rights from
the owner to a third party without misleading the creditors of the seller?
If one applied the stem logic of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to the "sale" of an owner's rights in receivables, he would find that the
sale had divested the seller of all of his rights, thus no creditor coming
later with a lien nor any subsequent purchaser would or could get
anything. In the early days some states-most notably New Yorkfollowed that logic and left the later claimants empty handed. 9 Other
states recognized the priority of the person who first gave notice to the
account debtor (the person whose rights were being sold). Later some
states passed laws similar to Article 9 that recognized the rights of the
first to do a public filing. 10
All of these transactions presented the same issue: to what extent
should the law search for and recognize substance when the substance

5 13 Co. Rep. 806 (Star Chamber 1601).
6 The discussion of this case is taken from GILMORE, supra note 2, § 2.1 n. 1.
7 See id. § 25.6.
8 U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2002) ("Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals
in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business."); see also United States v. Haddix & Sons, Inc., 415 F.2d 584 (6th
Cir. 1969); Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 868 P.2d 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (stating three
general policies supported by UCC 2-403).
9 See GILMORE, supra note 2, § 25.6.

10 See id. §§ 8.6-8, 25.6.
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of the transaction differed from the form.

II.

OLD ARTICLE 9

The original drafters of Article 9 understood all of this better than
any of us. Professor Gilmore, one of the drafters, is the source of most
of my knowledge of the history of current forms of security. He deals
with these issues in his magnificent treatise and he would have taught
much of this many times over in classes on security before the UCC was
proposed.
So one should not be surprised to find extensive
consideration of these issues in old Article 9 and Article 2. In one way
or another, the following sections deal with these issues: Sections 1201(37) (the buyer of an account holds a "security interest"), 9-102
(scope of Article 9), 9-105(l)(m) ("secured party" includes a buyer of
accounts), 9-105(1)(d) ("debtor" includes a seller of accounts), 9105(l)(c) ("collateral" includes sold accounts), 9-504(2) (no surplus or
deficiency if a sale), 2-326 (consignments, etc.), 2-403 (bailments to
sellers).
One might argue that subsections 9-102(1) and (2) were the most
revolutionary in the whole of Article 9. Here Gilmore uses a big broom
to sweep every conceivable form of security device into Article 9. He
well appreciated the clever work of creditors' lawyers in devising new
formulas to enable their clients to escape burdensome filing rules or

troublesome law on foreclosure or on attachment of security interests.
He brushes every transaction "regardless of form" into Article 9 if that
transaction is intended to create a security interest. The two subsections
read as follows:
§ 9-102. Policy and Subject Matter of Article
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded
transactions, this article applies
to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create
a security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods,
documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or
accounts; and also
to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract
including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust
deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt,
other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment
intended as security. This Article does not apply to statutory liens
except as provided in Section 9-310.

But even Professor Gilmore found it necessary to have a separate
subsection to bring in "sales of accounts or chattel paper." So does that
HeinOnline -- 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1746 2003-2004
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mean that Gilmore recognized that a sale conveyed a larger title than the
grant of a security interest'? Or was (1)(b) there only to make certain
that sales were within Article 9, a result that its language in (1)(a) might
not accomplish?
When he gets to 1-201(37), Professor Gilmore still distinguishes
sales from interests that "secure payment or performance" but here he is
unequivocal about the buyer's interest. The buyer of receivables holds
a "security interest." The first two sentences of the section read as
follows:
§ 1-201. General Definitions
(37) 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
The retention or reservation of title by seller of goods
notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 2-401) is
limited in effect to a reservation of security 'interest'. The term also
includes any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is
subject to Article 9.
There are two ways to read Gilmore's distinction between sales
and more conventional security interests. This might be no more than
the recognition that sales are typically non-recourse arrangements. The
implicit deal in a "sale" of receivables is that the buyer enjoys the
upside (if all of the accounts pay off) and that he, not the seller, bears
the downside (if many account debtors default). On the other hand one
might say Gilmore is making a more fundamental distinction and that
buried in that distinction is his view that the seller of receivables retains
a smaller fragment of title in the receivables than the grantor of a
security interest securing an obligation (a recourse transaction) retains.
One problem for the second hypothesis is that, in life, the line between
sale with no recourse and security with full recourse is seldom so stark.
Often "sales" carry some modest rights of recourse. For example a
buyer of receivables might bargain for the right to make the seller
repurchase all accounts that defaulted within thirty days of the sale-so
minimizing the seller's incentive to slip his dog accounts into the pile
that is sold.
It is possible that Gilmore and his cohorts, including Llewellyn,
never thought it necessary to identify the rights retained by a seller of
receivables where the buyer had perfected. No priority rules nor any
rights in foreclosure turn on the status of the seller's title. And
Llewellyn was notorious for his hostility to the use of title as a means of
determining rights under Article 2, and presumably Article 9.1"
Ignoring the status of title freed the drafters from complex and
confusing law that determined rights based on title. Avoidance of that
11 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV.
159 (1938) (criticizing the use of the concept of title in sales cases).
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terminology made it less likely for the new Code to be embarrassed by
old law embedded in common law cases or in earlier statutes.
On the other hand Gilmore's inclusion of certain sales of
receivables in Article 9 and his making the buyer's interest into a
security interest can only mean that a buyer who did not perfect was
subordinate to later perfected interests given by the seller and to
subsequent judicial lienors of the seller. If that did not follow, there was
no reason to include sales of receivables in Article 9. Of course, this
means that Gilmore would have found subsection 9-318(b) (if
unperfected, seller is deemed to retain rights he had before sale) to be a
tautology. In his kind way he might have said, "Well of course it is true
but why must we say it twice? Redundancy is good in some forms of
discourse but not in statutes."
So I leave old Article 9 clear that 9-318(b) would be the law of
Article 9, but uncertain as to what the drafters of old Article 9 would
say about 9-318(a).

III.

CASES AND THE PEB

In the early years of old Article 9 a few cases sniffed around the
edges of the problem. In one,' 2 the court had to decide who was entitled
to the excess receivables that were collected. If a sale, they go to the
buyer; if a security interest securing an obligation, they go to the seller.
A second case, 13 dealing with the same issue, contained a gratuitous
statement that any sale "entails the passage of title." That off hand
statement, doubtless made by a court unfamiliar with or uninterested in
the exquisitely complicated history, would endorse the securitizers'
position but conflict with Article 9's rules about priority of buyers who
had failed to perfect. Beyond recognizing and applying what Article 9
already said about the proper inferences concerning the right to
surpluses and deficiencies where there was a sale, neither of these cases
truly examined the rights of a seller who has made a sale of receivables
where the buyer has perfected.
In 1993, the first case truly to confront the critical issue, the
infamous Octagon Gas, Inc. v. Rimmer 14 was decided. There, the Tenth
Circuit held that an account that had been sold to a buyer who had
perfected was nevertheless part of the seller's bankruptcy estate. This
holding directly conflicted with the statement of law that has since
become 9-318(a), and it created panic in the securitization trade.' 5
12
13
14
15

Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979).
In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1988).
995 F.2d 948 (10thCir. 1993).
See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundationsof Securitization,39 WM. & MARY
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The Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") for the Uniform
Commercial Code responded to Octagon Gas and the ensuing panic in
the securitizers' ranks with haste, perhaps even indecent haste. In June
of 1994 the PEB issued Commentary Number 14. That commentary
"adopt[ed] a contrary position." Acting like an ersatz appellate court,
the PEB attempted to overrule Octagon Gas. The commentary also
proposed an addition to comment 2 to 9-102 that disavowed an intention
to leave any interest with a seller of accounts merely because he and his
buyer were called "debtor" and "secured party" respectively. The
commentary asserts that "a close reading of the text of Article 9 and its
comments... compels the conclusion that Article 9 does not prevent
16
the transfer of ownership."
To my mind, the haste with which the PEB acted, the exaggerated
claims about Article 9's text and comment, and the reliance on the weak
support of the earlier cases give the lie to the Board's apparent
confidence. A moderately cynical observer might surmise that the PEB
was answering the threat of the securitizers' hot poker. In fact a "close
reading" of the text and comments of old Article 9 leaves me in doubt
about how its drafters would have decided Octagon Gas, and I suspect
that the PEB members understood that. I suspect that they hastened
their criticism of Octagon Gas into print principally to still the cries of
the securitization industry.
The PEB commentary seemed to silence the natives until 2001
when Judge Bodoh issued a preliminary opinion in response to an
emergency motion in In re LTV Steel Company, Inc.,17 LTV and its
L. REv. 1055, 1058 (1998):
In Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), Judge Bobby
Baldock set off an international fire storm of rage and indignation with the following
humble statement: "The impact of applying Article 9 to Rimmer's account is that
Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as collateral would place Rimmer's account
within the property of [the] bankruptcy estate."
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Thomas E Plank, When a Sale is not a Sale: A Critique of
Octagon Gas, 48 CONSUMER FtN. L.Q. REP. 45, 45 (1994) (discussing the Octagon Gas
decision):
Although the facts of the case do not involve the typical originator and seller of
accounts and chattel paper, the court's erroneous language undermines the legal theory
for the sale of all accounts and chattel paper. Destruction of the legal basis for this
type of transaction may increase the financing costs of these businesses. First, buyers
may exact a higher cost (in the form of a lower price) for buying accounts and chattel
paper because they will be assuming the additional risk of the bankruptcy of the seller.
Second, many buyers may refuse to buy these receivables. If businesses can only
borrow on the security of these receivables, the reduction of the supply of the financing
may cause or allow the imposition of greater costs onto the borrower. In addition,
those businesses who can sell their receivables but who cannot obtain loans secured by
the receivables or otherwise raise money to continue or expand business may lose their
only source of financing.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
16 PEB Commentary No. 14, June 10, 1994, second paragraph (emphasis added).
17 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
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lenders had entered into an unconventional securitization of its
receivables and an even more unconventional procedure to move title to
LTV's inventory to a wholly owned subsidiary. The subsidiary to
which LTV sold the receivables had granted a perfected security interest
in those to a British bank. The subsidiary holding "title" to the
inventory had granted a perfected security interest to Chase and several
other banks.
In his preliminary opinion, Judge Bodoh ordered the "secured
lenders to turnover to Debtor the cash proceeds of the inventory and
receivables." The Judge refused to reverse that order without an
evidentiary hearing. His refusal was accompanied by the following
statement that must have sent chills through the securitizers' bones:
Furthermore, there seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest
that Debtor does not retain at least an equitable interest in the
property that is subject to the interim order. Debtor's business
requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various metal products.
To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products
that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be
derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the
inventory and receivables, and that this interest is property of the
Debtor's estate. This equitable interest is sufficient to support the
entry of the interim cash collateral order.
Even though the opinion was only "preliminary" and even though
it was issued by a bankruptcy judge and not by an appellate court, this
opinion was more threatening than the Octagon Gas opinion. First, it
was issued in a true securitization case. Second, it was issued in the
face of the best legal arguments that the securitization industry could
muster.
Third and lastly, it was issued despite the industry's
explanation of the economic cataclysm that might follow.' 8 Unlike
Octagon Gas, which appeared on the industry's radar screen without
18 See Greg Zipes, Securitization: Challenges in the Age of LTV Steel Company, Inc., 2002
ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 105, 113-14:
Following the entry of the interim financing order, numerous interest groups banded
together to convince the court it had made a mistake, and sought leave to file amici
curiae memoranda. These groups included sellers of asset-backed securities, issuers of
asset-backed securities, the Bond Market Association (which represented that its
members account for more than 97% of all primary market distribution and secondary
market trading of debt security in U.S. capital markets). (See, Motion For Leave To
File A Memorandum On Behalf Of Amici Curiae In Opposition To The Debtors'
Emergency Motion For An Order Granting Interim And Final Authority To Use Cash
Collateral at 1, 2). They contended that the 'Debtor's Emergency Motion not only
challenges the particulars of LTV's own receivable and inventory securitizations, but
also launches a frontal assault on the basic legal concepts of absolute transfers among
affiliated entities that make securitization possible.' (Id. at 3) The groups concluded
that the bankruptcy court had erred in assuming that the assets were part of the
originator's estate, and for permitting borrowing based upon the mistaken assumption.
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warning and delivered its ordinance without real opposition, here,
neither early warning nor a strong defense protected the industry
position.
Shortly after the opinion was issued, the secured lenders and LTV
entered into a financing agreement to allow LTV to use the receivables
and collateral and LTV gave up its challenge to the securitizations.
Judge Bodoh's approval of the financing agreement nullified the effect
of his interim opinion. Although the opinion was issued after 1999
Article 9 had been promulgated, the opinion makes no reference to 9318.

IV.

THE ARTICLE

9 REVISION

In the Article 9 revision process, the rights of securitizers against
the trustees in bankruptcy of their sellers only slowly bubbled to the
surface. What grew into section 9-318(b) first appears in the May 1996
draft of revised Article 9:19
(b) For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and
purchasers of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold
an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security interest is
unperfected, the debtor has rights and title to the account or chattel
paper identical to those the debtor sold.
The need for such a section may have occurred to the drafters from
their work on old 9-114. That section required a consignor (creditor) to
behave like a purchase money lender if he was to achieve priority over
secured creditors of the consignee (debtor). The February 1996 draft
added a new preliminary sentence that specified the consignee's
(debtor's) rights in goods transferred under a consignment. 20 For
consignments this is the analog to a statement of the rights of the seller
(debtor) of receivables. A consignee in a consignment occupies the
19 See U.C.C. Revised Art. 9 § 9-114 (Discussion Draft May 1996).
§ 9-114 Rights and Title of Consignee and Seller of Account or Chattel Paper with
Respect to Creditors and Purchasers.
(a) For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers of
goods from, a consignee, while goods are in the possession of the consignee and
the conignor's security interest is unperfected, the consignee has rights and title
to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.
(b) For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers of an
account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper,
while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor has rights and title to
the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.
Id.
20 For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers of goods from, a
consignee, while goods are in the possession of a consignee the consignee has rights and title
identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.
HeinOnline -- 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1751 2003-2004
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same position as the seller in the sale of receivables. In the one case we
need to know what the debtor-transferee got and in the other we need to
know what the debtor-seller retained. So, having specified the status of
a consignee's interest in the consigned goods in the preamble to 9-114,
the drafters apparently thought it appropriate to state the interest of a
seller of receivables.
If my guess is right-that old 9-114 suggested the need for a
statement of a consignee's title and that that statement in turn suggested
the need for a statement of a receivable seller's title-there is a real
irony because section 9-114 was later abandoned as unnecessary once
consignments had been redefined and included more extensively in
1999 Article 9. The only thing that remains of 9-114 in 1999 Article 9
2
is the 1999 drafters' addition put there as part of the revision process. '
In the May 1996 draft, the language that later became 9-318(b),
became black letter as 9-114(b). 22 In their comments, the drafters
acknowledge that they are unsure of the need for the section and suggest
that the statement of the debtor's rights in accounts sold is here as a
proper partner to the statement of the consignee's rights and title. The
section is in brackets to show that it has not yet earned a place in the
text.
The section disappears completely from the draft of October 1996.
The comments show that "[a]t its June, 1996, meeting the Drafting
Committee voted to eliminate 9-114 and requested the reporters to
explain in the comments that the same results may be achieved by
23 In
implication from a proper reading of Article 9's priority rules."
what might be regarded as a modest act of civil disobedience (or
perhaps merely an ungracious show of pique), the reporters include the
full text of the former 9-114 in the comments with the immodest claim
that the now rejected section "addressed this issue directly, clearly, and
succinctly." The reporters state that they "continue to prefer the
statutory approach ... ." By February 1997 old 9-114 reappears in the
text as section 9-31 5A; 24 the reporters got their way.

Neither the reporters nor the committee members to whom I have
spoken remember just why the committee pushed for removal.
Presumably the reporters pushed for inclusion because they believed the
statement of the law was accurate and that it would clarify things to
have it said in so many words. Recall that 9-318(a) has not yet come on
stage. It seems to me that 9-318(b) was redundant but, absent

21 See U.C.C. Revised Art. 9 § 9-319A (1999).

22 See id.§ 9-114(b).
23 See U.C.C. Revised Art. 9 (Discussion Draft Oct. 1996) (referencing more specifically
Reporters' cmt. 3).
24 See U.C.C. § 9-315A (Draft Feb. 1997). Rights and title of consignee and seller of account
or chattel paper with respect to creditors and purchasers.
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juxtaposition with section 9-315A, 9-318(b) would have caused little
trouble.
The comments to 9-315A in the August 1997 draft have an
example to show that a buyer who fails to perfect will be subordinate to
a later buyer who perfects. That draft also has a statement in the
comments that foretells 9-318(a):
However, if the security interest of a buyer of an account or chattel
paper is perfected, the seller normally would not retain property
rights in the account or chattel paper.
The reporters are not yet unequivocal; only normally the seller
retains no right. So at least in 1997, abnormally or non-normally the
seller would retain some rights even in sold receivables, even if the
buyer had perfected.
Things remain more or less unchanged until August of 1998 when
9-318 first becomes the home of the statement of the debtor-seller's
rights when the buyer has not perfected. In that draft the quoted
language from the August 1997 comments (all is gone on sale) is
formalized as comment 3 to 9-318:
3. Effect of Perfection. If the security interest of a buyer of accounts
or chattel paper is perfected, the seller normally would not retain any
property rights in the accounts or chattel paper.
In 1999 the formulation that now appears as section 9-318 is
adopted. This language has several significant changes from the 1998
drafts. First, the substance of comment 3 becomes 9-318(a). For the
first time the statute itself has the two arguably inconsistent statements
side by side. Neither the comments nor anything else written by the
reporters shows why subsection (a) came out of the comments and into
the text. 25 Is this the hand of the securitizers at work? Perhaps so. One
can imagine them saying that the presence of subsection (b) in the
statute entitles their provision (subsection (a)) to the same rank.
The statutory version drops the "normally" and the statement now
covers title not only to accounts and chattel paper but also to payment
intangibles and promissory notes. Were the latter two categories of
collateral added to give the securitizers cover for transfers of those
25 E-mail from Steven Harris, reporter to the Drafting Committee to revise Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9, to James J. white, Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School (Aug. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
It appears that Subsection (a) was added in response to a proposed comment (the final
version of which appears as comment 7 to 9-109) to the effect that the seller of a
receivable retains no interest in the receivable sold. A drafting committee member
thought the proposed comment was inconsistent with the language in the approved
draft (which ... is to the effect that, under specified circumstances and for specified
purposes, 'the debtor has rights and title.., identical to those the debtor sold'.).
Subsection (a) was designed to eliminate any argument that the text did not support the
comment.
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commonly securitized assets? Of course, a securitizer assumes that he
will perfect and is concerned principally with the trustee's capacity to
grab hold of something remaining in the debtor's hands even after a sale
where the buyer has perfected.
The other change that first appears in 1999 is the addition of the
verb "deemed" in 9-318(b). Formerly the section read, "while the
buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor has rights and title
... identical to those the debtor sold." (emphasis added). In 1999 that
becomes "while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor
is deemed to have rights and title ... identical to those the debtor sold."
(emphasis added). Is the title of one who "has" rights different from the
title of one who is "deemed to have" rights? I am not sure. Here
evidently the conflict between (a) "retains nothing" and (b) "has rights"
got stuck in the drafters' esophagus. And maybe they are right; the pill
is easier to swallow if we say only that the seller will be treated as
though he had rights. As a legal realist, I remain skeptical. I would
argue that the addition of the verb "deemed" in 1999 shows the drafters'
anxiety about the very question dealt with in this paper. It marks where
the horse is buried.
Having upgraded "normally" to always, but still aware of the
possible conflict between the two subsections, the drafters turned to the
comments. As I read the comments to 9-318 and those to 9-109, [ think
I can sometimes hear Chuck Mooney's voice rising (or perhaps the
voices of both Steve and Chuck). It is like speaking to one who does
not understand English: if you shout, perhaps they will understand.
In Comment 2 to 9-318 Chuck reinforces the statute by asserting
not only that a seller has "no interest" but that he "retains no interest
whatsoever in the property" (emphasis added).
In Comment 5 to 9-109 he speaks even louder. First he tells the
reader to draw no inferences about title from the use of words like
"debtor, security interest [or] collateral." His voice rises to a crescendo
toward the end:
It [subsequent creditors' achieving priority over a buyer who has not
perfected] is so for the simple reason that Sections 9-318(b), 9-317,

and 9-322 make it so as did former Sections 9-301 and 9-312.
Because the buyer's security interest is unperfected, for purposes of
determining the rights of creditors of and purchasers for value from
the debtor-seller, under Section 9-318(b) the debtor-seller is deemed
to have the rights and title it sold.
Is it unfair to suggest that this shouting shows doubt, or perhaps
exasperation with committee members who don't "get it?" And does
not the need to change "has" to "deemed to have" show the same? Of
course, making it clear that subsection 9-318(b) states the rights of most
subsequent takers outside of bankruptcy does not itself answer the real
question, whether it is proper for a court to infer from the rule now
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stated in 9-318(b) that there is a large enough title fragment left behind
to give a trustee in bankruptcy a hand hold under section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code even if the buyer has perfected.

CONCLUSION
In this paper I have described but a small by-play in the unceasing
effort of secured creditors (in this case securitizers) to escape the grasp
of the trustee in bankruptcy and of the opposing effort of the unsecureds
to strengthen that reach. Unsecured creditors, through their agent the
trustee in bankruptcy, look everyday for ways to avoid security interests
(544 et seq.), to forestall secured creditors' claims to interest during the
bankruptcy (506), to take a bit of the milk produced by the secureds'
cow during bankruptcy (363), to expand the bankruptcy estate (541),
and generally to obstruct acts that the secured could take outside of
bankruptcy (362).
Because the rights of the trustee arise from federal bankruptcy law,
drafters of state law have only a circumscribed capacity to restrict the
trustee. According to the Supreme Court, federal bankruptcy law must
depend on and respect state law rules on security, passage of title, and
the like. 26 But the state law cannot deny rights to the trustee that it
would grant to a similarly situated creditor. 27 So limiting a trustee's
26 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994) (stating that the Court will not
presume an intention on the part of Congress in enacting bankruptcy laws to displace traditional
state regulation over the security and stability of title to real property); Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48 (1979) (noting that the results in federal bankruptcy proceedings will vary as the state
law governing security interests varies).
27 See Butner, 440 U.S. at 52-57 (granting certiorari to resolve a conflict between Circuits on
the proper interpretation of the federal statutes governing the administration of bankrupt estates.
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits all look to state law to determine whether a
security interest in property extends to rents and profits derived from the property. The Third and
Seventh Circuits had adopted a federal rule of equity that affords the mortgagee a secured interest
in the rents even if state law would not recognize any such interest until after foreclosure. The
Supreme Court held:
The constitutional authority of Congress to establish 'uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States' would clearly encompass a federal
statute defining the mortgagee's interest in the rents and profits earned by property
in a bankrupt estate. But Congress has not chosen to exercise its power to fashion
any such rule. The Bankruptcy Act does include provisions invalidating certain
security interests as fraudulent or as improper preferences over general creditors.
Apart from these provisions, however, Congress has generally left the determination
of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.
Id. at 54.
The Supreme Court thus rejected a uniform Federal treatment of property interests, which would
reduce uncertainty, and discourage forum shopping with the possibility of a windfall by
happenstance of bankruptcy, because this approach would afford mortgagee's rights they did not
have as a matter of state law. The Court held:
The rule we adopt avoids this inequity because it looks to state law to define the
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rights by state law is like trying to control an obstinate robot from a
remote location; sometimes the directions get through and sometimes
they don't. Have the drafters succeeded here? Probably.
First one should understand that subsection 9-318(b) does not
change the law. The rule stated in that subsection was plainly the law
under the former version of Article 9.
Whether the rule stated in subsection (a) was the law before 1999
is less clear. Octagon Gas said no, whereas the PEB said yes. Because
state laws are coming close to adding a provision that makes special
rules for the trustee, compared with others, its success is not assured.
For all of the reasons stated above, I think the drafters were themselves
unsure of their success. The inclusion of a bulletproof securitizers'
protection in the failed Bankruptcy Bill of 200228 demonstrates that
security interest of the mortgagee.

At the same time, our decision avoids the

opposite inequity of depriving a mortgagee of his state-law security interest when
bankruptcy intervenes.... The essential point is that in a properly administered
scheme in which the basic federal rule is that state law governs, the primary reason
why any holder of a mortgage may fail to collect rent immediately after default must
stem from state law.
Id. at 56, 57 (citations omitted); see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
541.LH[3][a](15th ed. Rev. 2000).
The Bankruptcy Code in Section 541 eliminates any unnecessary, avoidable
dependence on nonbankruptcy law. Section 541 provides that the commencement
of a case creates an estate consisting, most importantly, of all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property at the time of the commencement of the case.
Under this provision it will still be necessary to look to nonbankruptcy law, usually
state law, to determine whether the debtor has any legal or equitable interest in any
particular item. However, unlike the requirement of Section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, it is not necessary under the code to further determine whether the
nonbankruptcy law permits the debtor to transfer the property or permits the
debtor's creditors to reach it. Although the debtor's interest in an item will be
determined by nonbankruptcy law, the question of what constitutes property within
the meaning of Section 541 apparently remains a federal question.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and
Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3 (2001).

Id.

Since the federal bankruptcy law generally defers to non-bankruptcy law to define
the rights of the parties in interest in a bankruptcy proceeding, any significant
change in an important area of substantive state law is likely to have bankruptcy
implications. However, the bankruptcy implications of the current revision of
Article 9 are particularly significant because Article 9 defines the relative ights in
the estate's personal property of the most significant players in many bankruptcy
cases - the secured and unsecured creditors. Thus, changes in Article 9 can go to the
heart of the bankruptcy and reorganization process.
28 11 U.S.C. § 912. Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended (1) in Subsection (b), by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset was
transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an eligible
entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such asset
(or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee under Section 550 by
virtue of avoidance under 548(a); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
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even the securitizers have doubt.
Although I am put off by the securitizers' hysterical claims that the
sky will fall if they are treated like ordinary secured creditors in
bankruptcy, I am convinced that the Bankruptcy Code should be more
respectful of security interests than it has been, and, for that reason, I
hope that the courts eventually adopt the position of the PEB and of the
drafters of 1999 Article 9.
I suspect that the inclusion of 9-318 in 1999 Article 9 has modestly

diminished the chances for securitizers. By thrusting the inconsistency
(follow form here, follow substance there) before courts' noses, the
section makes clear what a court is doing when it treats securitized
assets as beyond the trustee's reach. And by leaving behind trash in the

(f) For purposes of this Section (1) the term 'asset-backed securitization' means a transaction in which eligible assets
transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of payment on securities,
including, without limitation, all securities issued by governmental units, at least one
class of tranche of which was rated investment grade by one or more nationally
recognized securities rating organizations, when the securities were initially issued by
an issuer;
(2) the term 'eligible asset' means(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof), either fixed or
revolving, whether or not the same are in existence as of the date of the transfer,
including residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer receivables, trade
receivables, assets of governmental units, including payment obligations relating to
taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other sources of revenues and lease receivables, that,
by their terms, convert into cash within a finite period of time, plus any residual
interest in property subject to receivables included in such financial assets plus any
rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds
to security holders;
(B) cash; and
(C) securities, including without limitation, all securities issued by governmental units;
(3) the term 'eligible entity' means(A) an issuer; or
(3) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, limited liability company
(including a single member limited liability company), or other entity engaged
exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring eligible assets directly or
indirectly to an issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto;
(4) the term 'issuer' means a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity engaged
exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding eligible assets, issuing securities
backed by eligible assets, and taking actions ancillary thereto; and
(5) the term 'transferred' means the debtor, under a written agreement, represented
and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or otherwise conveyed with
the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor pursuant to Subsection
(b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this title or any Section hereof), irrespective
and without limitation of(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in the issuer
or any securities issued by the issuer;
(3) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or supervise the
servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for tax,
accounting, regulatory reporting, or other purposes.
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statute ("deemed") and in the comments (it means what it says and
nothing more "whatsoever"), the drafters have shown their own
uncertainty. In my opinion it would have been better if the drafters had
not felt compelled to say what was already known-that (b) was the
law-and if the securitizers had not then insisted on equal billing by the
addition of subsection (a).
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